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Collective Bargaining: A Management View
Robert Abelow*
As an experienced negotiatorfor management, Mr. Abelow considers
the various provisions which often cause the most trouble in negotiating
labor settlement agreements, and he offers suggestions for management
concerning the successful resolution of issues arising in these negotiations. The rejection by union membership of the settlement agreement
is an increasingly frequent occurrence which Mr. Abelow sees as a
primary obstacle to successful negotiation.
I. INTRODUCIION

In the unpredictable area of labor negotiations, it is difficult to
anticipate the course that will be taken by unions in their quest for
higher wages, greater benefits and more favorable working conditions.
What has happened over the last few years, however, may furnish
some clues. While future negotiations may not seem to be very
different from those in the past, there will be a variety of challenging
issues and new problems that management will have to face. No
longer are unions content to bargain merely for more wages, shorter
hours, more numerous holidays, greater vacations, and other conventional fringe benefits. These things they now expect as a matter
of course. Indeed, industry itself has recognized the need for improvements in these areas as the cost of living rises, as patterns
emerge from industry to industry, and as competition for labor, especially skilled labor, makes it necessary to meet prevailing conditions.
There is little to suggest that unions will become more moderate
in their demands or that industry will be able to meet the ever
increasing costs of doing business without increases in productivity
and without advances in operating efficiency. Unions today are concentrating on a variety of issues which, for want of a better term,
may be called "job protection" issues. These are really not new
issues, but refinements of those that have been placed on the
bargaining table in the past. Indicative of some of the job protection
provisions which unions seek are: (1) improved seniority clauses;
(2) on-the-job training for higher rated positions; (3) obligatory
trial periods when job openings occur; (4) clauses which require all
bargaining unit work to be done exclusively by employees covered
by the contract; (5) additional restrictions against subcontracting;
(6) protection against plant closures, sales, mergers, moving the
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plant or relocating any of its departments; (7) assurances that contracts, jobs and job opportunities will survive sales and mergers; and
(8) other "tailored" provisions designed to insure job tenure, maintenance of standards and union security.
Unions have come to the conclusion that money is not everything,
and they are now seeking a voice in the decision making process
which management has always regarded as being within its exclusive
domain. There is a persistent attempt to invade management rights
by requiring prior consultation and consent, or at least prior arbitration, before changes may be made which affect employees. Despite
protests to the contrary, unions have come to regard themselves as
partners in the running of the enterprise and are seeking a voice in
the conduct of the business. They seek the type of clauses indicated
above, claiming that they are "non-money" issues which are needed
to protect the jobs and the job security of the employees and which
cost the employer nothing. Realistically, most of these provisions are
cost items-sometimes hidden, but sometimes quite visible. They are
further restrictions on an employer's right to manage his enterprise
efficiently and economically. Frequently, they are more expensive in
the long run than the so-called "money items" upon which fixed costs
can be ascertained.
In the area of grievance and arbitration machinery, unions are
demanding protection against damage claims and court actions and
insisting that arbitration be the sole and exclusive remedy for all
disputes. Not only are unions insisting upon arbitration of grievances
arising under the contract, but they are also insisting upon arbitration
of other types of disputes growing out of the relationship between
the parties, whether covered by the contract or not. Unions also seek
immunity from damage claims in the event of so-called "wildcat
strikes" and fiercely resist provisions which would enable management
to obtain relief from courts when "no-strike" clauses are violated.
Management is faced with the problem of finding an accommodation between its objectives of operating efficiently, remaining competitive, paying fair wages, granting reasonable fringe benefits,
remaining strike-free, and the objectives of the union in getting more
pay for employees, protecting jobs and job opportunities, making the
union more secure, and obtaining a voice in the running of the
business. In a recent negotiation in which the writer was involved,
it took two months to settle the so-called "non-money" issues and only
two days to agree upon "money" matters.
It will be the purpose of this article to discuss some of the changes
that unions are now seeking and will continue to seek in forthcoming
contract negotiations and to suggest some approaches which management may take.
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II. NEGOTIATION
A. Welfare and Pension Programs
Hardly a negotiation takes place today without a union proposal
for increased welfare and pension benefits. By this time, most unionized employers provide some measure of welfare benefits such as
Blue Cross, Blue Shield, hospitalization plans, life insurance, and
disability payments. There is a steady drive by unions to improve
this type of employee benefit which is not included in the employees'
gross income for income tax purposes. It is, however, regarded as an
expense item for the employer and is deductible from the employer's
gross income for tax purposes. Employers have usually agreed
to devote some of the available settlement money for these welfare
improvements not only because they are worthwhile and beneficial,
but also because they do not increase the cost of doing business quite
so much as do wage rate increases. For example, it is less costly to
pay a premium to a medical plan or an insurance company than it
is to pay the equivalent amount in wages, because higher wage rates
bring in their wake greater overtime costs, holiday pay, vacation
pay, sick pay, and other items which are based upon wage rates.
There is a growing trend on the part of unions to push for these
improved welfare benefits and to exclude their costs from the socalled "money package." This trend is likely to continue.
Pension arrangements, however, are not so common, and many
industries and employers have not negotiated pension plans. It can
be anticipated that unions will strive for creation of pension programs
and for improvement of existing pension plans where they are already
in effect. Here, again, employers find advantages to themselves in
meeting demands of this nature, not only for the same reasons that
motivate them in making welfare contributions, but also because
pension programs facilitate retirement and replacement of older
employees.
In the pension area there is a growing union demand for vested
rights, for early retirement provisions and, more recently, for pension
portability. The reserves in existing retirement plans set up by private
employers and by state and local governments to date have reached
astronomical figures and the National Bureau of Economic Research
estimates that these huge amounts will be doubled and perhaps
tripled within the next ten or fifteen years. All of this does not
include the funds accumulated under the Social Security program
and other federal programs. The movement toward more and larger
pensions will continue unabated, and employers would be well advised to prepare for proposals of this nature.
It is unlikely that the unions in private industry will achieve the
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very liberal pensions that have been obtained for government employees, because most pension plans provided by government are
contributory plans where an employee shares part of the cost. Most
pension programs in the private sector are fully paid for by the
employer.
B. Job Protection Clauses

Job protection clauses come in all sizes and shapes. The simplest
and most common clause sought by the unions provides, in effect,
that all work that can be done by employees in the bargaining unit
must be given to them exclusively. The objectives of these clauses
are to eliminate subcontracting, create more job opportunities, provide
overtime work, preserve the existing work force and protect it against
diminution by the transfer of work to outside sources, even though
it may be more economical and more efficient from the employer's
point of view to have the work done elsewhere.
The drive for work preservation clauses has been given impetus
by recent court decisions which have upheld their legality if their
objective is to preserve or recapture the work for bargaining unit
employees that has traditionally been done by them. If the purpose
of the work preservation clauses is to bring pressure upon another
employer for organizational purposes or to affect the labor policies of
another employer with whom the union has a relationship, such
clauses are deemed unlawful product boycotts. 1
C. Plant Removals, Sales, Mergers

When a plant is sold, relocated, or merged into another corporation, employees can be affected. These are areas where unions are
seeking contract provisions which insure not only job tenure for
employees, but also the continuance and assumption of union contracts by successors. Management today must deal with union proposals under which employers are required to remain in the same
location and maintain existing facilities for the life of the contract,
to take the contract with them if they move, to offer jobs at other
locations to present employees on a priority basis, to pay substantial
amounts in severance pay to employees whose jobs are lost by plant
closures or who refuse to take employment at new locations, and to
guarantee that the obligations of the contract will be assumed by
new owners no matter what form the sale or transfer of the business
takes. Unions have found support for these proposals in court and
1. See, e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967);
Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 385 U.S. 811 (1967); NLRB v. Local
28, Sheet Metal Workers, -380 ,F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1967); .Local 455, Pipe Fitters, 167
N.L.R.B. 79 (1967); Local 8, Asbestos Workers, 163 N.L.R.B. 68 (1967).
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Labor Board decisions, which have required new ow-ners to arbitrate
disputes between the union and the old owners and to recognize
the union and the union contract which they never anticipated. 2
Clauses of this nature impose unforeseen obligations upon an
employer and sometimes prevent a sale or merger even when all
else is agreeable. This type of union proposal is characterized by
unions as a "non-cost" proposal, and frequently this is so-provided
that nothing happens which makes a plant closure, sale, relocation
or merger necessary or desirable. These proposals go much further
than is presently called for by Labor Board and court decisions,
which require advance discussion and bargaining with the union
when the employer-employee relationship under the contract is affected. 3 Provisions of this nature are designed to ensure union
security, job protection and work preservation. They appear with
increasing frequency in union proposals and present difficult and
perplexing problems to which there are no ready answers.
D. Crisis Bargaining

The complexity and multiplicity of today's union proposals require
management to take a look at its own bargaining techniques in order
to avoid last minute decisions which frequently must be made as the
strike deadline approaches. It is frequently impossible to deal intelligently and objectively with some of the complex problems presented
within the 30 or 60 day negotiation period before the contract expires.
Many of the so-called "non-money" proposals require long-range
thinking and planning. Other proposals are simply the outgrowth of
unsettled in-plant grievances which might well have been discussed
and disposed of through the grievance procedure or by arbitration
prior to negotiations. Still other proposals, such as pension proposals,
require actuarial advice or call for exhaustive studies which are
impossible to obtain in a limited period of time.
Some techniques which management has found helpful in dealing
with these problems include the more effective use of grievance
procedures, advance studies of proposals which management knows
will be on the bargaining table, pre-negotiation conferences with
union officials and employee committees before demands are formulated by the membership and positions are hardened, and the
2. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Wackenhut
Corp. v. United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Ci. 1964); Monroe Sander
Corp. v. Livingston, 262 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); McGuire v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 247 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
3. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); Town & Country
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 136 N.L.R.B. 1002 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1963).
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establishment of human relations or labor-management committees
to discuss problems (not grievances) during the life of the contract.
Post-negotiation discussions on issues that cannot readily be solved
before the contract expires and which call for arbitration as the
terminal point in the event of continued disagreement are also effective. Furthermore, the entire removal from negotiations of certain
issues, which the parties foresee cannot be solved quickly by mutual
agreement, may be accomplished under an arrangement whereby
such issues will be arbitrated and the award will be incorporated in
the contract.
It may also be desirable to arrange for key management and labor
officials to participate in the closing hours of negotiations when deadlocks or strikes appear likely. It is not customary for top management officials to be part of the negotiating team. In fact, it is
generally unwise to have them sit at the bargaining table at all.
Their presence, however, at crucial times lends emphasis to positions
taken and often proves helpful in reaching decisions or compromises.
There is, of course, no substitute for mutual agreement reached
across the table, but frequently troublesome issues can be resolved
and strikes can be avoided by the selective and ingenious use of some
of the methods indicated.
E. Grievances and Arbitration
Management often makes a mistake by failing to take the initiative
in bringing unsettled grievances to arbitration. Traditionally it is the
union that grieves, not management, and often the grievance procedure is written to afford only unions the right to bring matters to
arbitration. Grievances, however, sometimes "hang fire" and remain
as irritants despite attempts to resolve them during the life of the
contract. When they are unresolved, they invariably appear as
union proposals during negotiations for a renewal contract. At that
time, they usually are inflated out of proportion to their true importance.
Whether an employer has the right to invoke the grievance and
arbitration procedure depends upon the wording of the contract.
Courts, however, have been inclined to afford the employer access
to the grievance procedure even though the contract does not expressly so provide.4 Sometimes management should take the initiative
uider the contract, especially where strikes take place in violation of
the agreement-wildcat or otherwise. In those instances, even where
union officials claim that the strike occurred without their sanction
or approval, arbitration proceedings requesting damages and cease
4. See, e.g., Franchi Constr. Co. v. Local 560, Hod Carriers, 248 F. Supp. 134 (D.
Mass. 1965).
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and desist orders might well be instituted by employers. Arbitrating
the claim against the union provides the advantage of obtaining a
prompt disposition of the underlying dispute, offers the best opportunity for bringing illegal work stoppages to an end, and avoids
lengthy and extensive court proceedings. There have been many
instances where arbitrators have awarded damages for such breaches
of the no-strike clause.5
In at least one oft-quoted case, an arbitrator's cease and desist order
(in effect an injunction) directing the union to cease slowdowns,
which he found to be in violation of the contract, was upheld by
the Court of Appeals of New York.6 More recently, the Fifth Circuit
came to the same conclusion. This court pointed out that the enforcement of the arbitrator's award, although injunctive in nature, would
be doing no more than enforcing the agreement of the parties to
the contract and that once the arbitration is completed, the matter
becomes ripe for specific performance and falls outside the 7scope
of the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
The disciplining of strikers or union leaders participating in the
strike is a remedy that is always available, but not always practical,
and such action frequently fosters additional strife. However, even
in those cases where the proof is insufficient to implicate the union
in the breach of the no-strike clause by employees, or where the
union has an "immunity" clause against damage claims, the institution of the proceeding has a salutary effect. It subjects the union to
the expense of proceeding, compels union officials and shop stewards
to justify or, at least, to explain what was done, and acts as a deterrent
to future violations of the same nature. This is but one specific instance where employers may use the grievance and arbitration
machinery to their advantage.
F. Management Proposals

Employers should review their contracts carefully before going
into negotiations. Clauses become outmoded or, in actual operation,
do not always serve the purposes for which they were intended.
5. See, e.g., Sidney Wanzer & Sons v. Teamsters Local 753, 249 F. Supp. 664 (N.D.
Ill. 1966); Publishers' Ass'n v. Stereotypers Union, 8 N.Y.2d 414, 171 N.E.2d 323,
208 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1960); Publishers Ass'n of New York, 37 Lab. Arb. 509 (1961),
39 Lab. Arb. 565 (1962), 42 Lab. Arb. 95 (1964); Oregonian Publishing Co., 33
Lab. Arb. 575 (1959); Regent Quality Furniture, Inc., 32 Lab. Arb. 553 (1959).
6. Ruppert v. Egelhoter, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 785 N.Y.S.2d 148 (1958).
See also Marine Transp. Lines v. Curran, 65 L.R.R.M. 2095 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Gulf
& So. Am. S.S. Co. v. National Maritime Union, 360 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1966);
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. International Longshoreman's Ass'n, 365 F.2d 295
(3d Cir. 1966).
7. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. Longshoremen (ILA) Local 1418, 67 L.R.R.M. 2430
(Jan. 26, 1968).
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Conflicts and ambiguities come to light during the administration of
the contract, and differing interpretations of clauses that seem clear
breed grievances.
Management should never hesitate to put its own proposals for
contract changes on the table. Negotiations are a two-way street and
the opportunity to improve the contract should not be missed. Unions
traditionally resist changes sought by employers and are loathe to
give up any advantage they have, or think they have. Nevertheless,
management proposals should be advanced and pursued just as vigorously as are union proposals. They serve a dual purpose in that they
provide the platform for serious discussion of company problems, and
they can be withdrawn or modified in order to reach compromises.
III. SETTLEMENT REJECTIONS
Finally, we come to the newest development in bargaining-the
frequent rejection by union employees of settlements agreed upon
with the union. While settlements reached in negotiations are generally subject to the approval of the membership, such approvals
in the past have followed almost as a matter of course. Lately,
however, these settlements are being rejected with alarming frequency, and the possibility of rejection by the membership can no
longer be disregarded by management negotiators.
While union representatives may be dismayed by these developments, and while mediators may point to these rejections with
growing concern, the problems resulting from a rejected settlement
fall squarely upon the employer, who has strained to meet the
demands of the union and has, in good faith, made or agreed to a
final proposal with the expectation that it would be recommended
and approved. The number of rejections is much higher than the
figures indicated by governmental agencies. 8 More often than not,
federal and state meditators do not participate in negotiations and
have no record of the many rejections that take place after settlements
have been agreed upon with the union negotiating committee. The
problem is a vexing one, and neither management nor union
negotiators have been able to find effective solutions.
A variety of reasons has been offered for these rank and file rejections. These include: the increasing militancy of the union membership; the frequent failure of negotiators to settle local or in-plant
grievances and issues which members feel are important or in which
8. Address by Walter A. Maggiolo, Disputes Director, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, at Vanderbilt University, Oct. 3, 1967, reported in BNA, 66
LAB. RL. REP. 94; address by William E. Simukin, Director, Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service, at University of Chicago, Nov. 7, 1967, reported in BNA, 66
LA. Yzr. REP. 219.

1968 ]

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

they are emotionally involved; the failure to expose the membership
to the give and take processes inherent in collective bargaining; the
failure of union leadership to explain adequately the reasons for the
settlement and the compromises reached; and, most important, the
failure to achieve the gains and improvements which the membership
expected.
Union proposals are usually formulated at union membership meetings, and the sky is generally the limit when asking an employer for
changes and improvements. When the expectations of the membership are not realized, disappointment and resentment follow. Not
being exposed directly to the bargaining process, the membership
frequently cannot understand why concessions and compromises have
to be made if there is to be an agreement.
Settlements are always disappointing. The employer finds that he
must make concessions and do things that he never expected to do,
and the union negotiators find that they cannot get what they
expected. Both sides feel that they gave too much and got too little.
Union members frequently believe that there is everything to gain
and nothing to lose by sending their negotiators back for a new try
and are encouraged in this belief by the frequency with which
employers materially improve their so-called final offer after a rejection. Faced with this very real problem, management must devise
new approaches to cope with the situation.
Experience has shown that some of the following methods have
proved helpful. First, the problem of possible rejection should be
discussed openly with the union negotiating committee. The committee should be pledged to give a detailed account to the membership
of how and why the settlement was reached and what compromises
were needed. Second, the settlement agreement should be reduced to
writing, and union spokesmen should be asked to read and explain the
settlement to the membership. It should incorporate a commitment
from the negotiating committee not only to recommend acceptance,
but also to speak out strongly in favor of the settlement at the membership meeting. Frequently, at the first sign of opposition from the
floor, members of the negotiating committee become passive and
silent, fearing criticism and disapproval. Third, any final offer made by
the employer should be contingent upon acceptance and approval of
every member of the union negotiating team. Offers presented to the
rank and file by a split committee or without recommendation are
usually rejected. Wherever possible, the settlement should be the
result of an acceptance by management of the union's final offer,
rather than vice versa. Fourth, management should carefully evaluate
the in-plant problems of the rank and file members and, so far as
possible, settle these issues. It is unwise to disregard them or to
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believe that they will be forgotten if the economic package is big
enough.
Furthermore, the union should be persuaded to keep the
membership informed of the progress of the bargaining sessions in
order to prepare the rank and file for the compromises that must
inevitably follow. Sometimes a rejection is needed before a final
agreement can be reached. Employee expectations may be so high
that no management proposal will be acceptable the first time around.
Management negotiations, as far as possible, should appraise this type
of situation and hold something back if they come to the realization
that a second round of negotiations may have to follow. In this connection, it is sometimes helpful to discuss the problem candidly with
the international representative or the business agent who may
offer valuable guidance. Sincere union representatives, who, like
management negotiators, hope to achieve a fair settlement without
a strike, often will respond to a good faith approach by management
and frankly state whether or not a first settlement will be approved,
or whether they need advance authority from the membership to
conclude a deal without further ado. If there is a rejection, there
should be a cooling off period, and no meeting should be scheduled
for a short time, even if there is a strike in progress. Nothing sets
the pattern for rejections in future negotiations as does a quick and
greatly improved offer from the employer following a rank and file
rejection. More important, while the final settlement following a
rejection will usually require some change or improvement, if there
has to be a "sweetener," it should be insubstantial whenever possible.
This is necessary, even though a strike may be in progress, to insure
that the rejection and the resultant delay are not made worthwhile to
the union. Sometimes only the passage of time and the continued loss
of earnings will bring an end to the dispute. Finally, contract expiration dates should be established, if possible, long before or long after
local union elections. This will avoid being caught in a political
atmosphere, with aspirants for office who are on the union negotiating
team vying with each other to produce a settlement upon which they
can capitalize.
Management has survived a great deal of bargaining and will
survive much more. However, it must develop new methods and
new techniques to meet the challenges of the union. Bargaining is
becoming more complex and should be planned for and conducted
with the same preparation and care that would be used in entering
any other important and far-reaching business deal. Most union
negotiators are supported by the expertise and help of union research
departments and have the additional advantage of knowing what
has been obtained from other unionized companies in the area and
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throughout the country. There is a spirit of "me too-ism" pervading
labor negotiations today, which disregards local problems, plant
problems and competitive problems. Unions range far afield in
making comparisons. Every effort should be made to conduct negotiations so as to meet the problems of the company, the union, and the
employees involved in the enterprise covered by the contract in order
to engage in realistic collective bargaining rather than in collective
duplication of what some other company and union have done.
Satisfactory relationships between management and labor can be
built up and preserved only through mutual understanding, cooperation and respect. The task of maintaining proper labor relations is a
continuing one and depends as much upon the day-to-day administration of the contract as upon the wording of the contract itself.
Employer rights and prerogatives incorporated in the contract and
agreed to by the union should not be relinquished by careless
administration. To the extent that these considerations are understood,
management and labor will continue to move forward toward their
mutual goal of a satisfactory relationship for the benefit of all.

